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Abstract Certain degree constructions have been observed to systematically give
rise to evaluativity inferences, by which gradable predicates are interpreted relative
to a contextually provided standard of comparison. It has been proposed that the
obligatoriness of these inferences results from a competition between ‘marked’ vs.
‘unmarked’ degree constructions that are semantically equivalent (Rett 2008). Yet,
no explanation has been offered so far to account for the source of markedness in
these constructions. Building upon previous decompositional approaches to degree
expressions (Rullmann 1995; Büring 2007; Heim 2008), the present paper argues
that structural complexity is the right metrics for a competition-based account of
evaluativity, and develops a modular account of evaluativity in comparatives.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, linguists have tried to capture the set of entailment patterns associated
with comparative constructions while taking stock of the primitive meanings of
comparison, i.e., by identifying the semantic contribution of each degree morpheme.
Consider for example the comparative in (1). The sentence describes a situation
where Athos’ height exceeds Porthos’ height. Alternative ways of describing this
situation include the degree constructions provided in (2a) and (2b):
(1) Athos is taller than Porthos is.
(2) a. Porthos is shorter than Athos is.
b. Porthos is less tall than Athos is.
On recent analyses, the way (2a) and (2b) relate to (1) is explained by the presence
of a negative operator that either (a) reverses the polarity of the adjective – i.e., short
is interpreted as the negation of tall in (2a), or (b) changes the comparative operator
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from -er to less, as in (2b) (Rullmann 1995; Büring 2007; Heim 2008 among others).
It naturally follows from this characterization that the three comparatives entail each
other. Against this background, it is surprising that the degree constructions in (3)
are not good paraphrases for the sentence in (1):
(3) a. Athos is less short than Porthos is.
b. Porthos is more short than Athos is.
c. Athos is more tall than Porthos is.
Note that, just like in (1)-(2), the degree constructions in (3) are compatible with
a situation where Athos’ height exceeds Porthos’, but they somehow introduce an
additional entailment. For example, for the comparative of inferiority in (3a) and the
analytic comparative in (3b) to be felicitously uttered, Athos and Porthos have to
count as ‘short’ in the context. In turn, (3c) gives rise to the inference that Athos
and Porthos count as ‘tall’ in the context. This type of context sensitivity, by which
gradable predicates are interpreted relative to a contextually-provided standard of
comparison has been called ‘evaluativity’ (Rett 2008, 2015; Breakstone 2014 among
others). Note that no analogous inference arises in any of the sentences in (1), (2a) or
(2b). For instance, (1) and (2b) involve the adjective tall, but the two sentences can
be felicitously uttered in contexts where Athos and Porthos are short1. In essence,
the above paradigm raises the following questions: how can we derive suitable
meanings for the evaluative sentences in (3) while preserving our assumptions about
the semantics of degree morphemes? Is there a way of predicting which degree
constructions are evaluative?
One of the main accounts of evaluativity relies on the idea of a markedness
competition (Rett 2007, 2008).2 At the core of this approach is the idea that degree
constructions come in pairs composed of a marked and an unmarked member. The
unmarked construction precludes the marked construction whenever they express
the same meaning. The markedness-based competition account further argues that
the presence of an optional evaluativity operator can break the competition, thereby
forcing the evaluative construal of a degree construction to surface. However, the
explanatory scope of this account is limited by the fact that it leaves unexplained the
source of markedness and consequently, the way competitors are determined is not
fully predictable.
My aim in this paper is to provide a theory of what counts as alternatives for
semantic competition in the aP domain. In particular, I argue that ‘markedness’
1 In fact, there seems to be some inter-speaker variation in this case as (2b) is sometimes judged as
necessarily evaluative.
2 In recent work, the EVAL account is no longer pursued by Rett who now proposes a treatment of
evaluativity as arising as a manner implicature (see Rett 2015, 2018)
728
in the sense of Rett’s can be cashed out in terms of structural complexity once we
adopt a decompositional analysis of degree expressions. The paper is organized as
follows. In Section 2, I review Rett’s (2007, 2008) evaluativity account and discuss
the limits of the markedness-based competition. Section 3 argues that structural
complexity is the relevant metrics for competition. Section 4 introduces the LF-
principle that governs structural competition, and Section 5 suggests a modification
of this principle which is made sensitive to the morphophonological properties of
competitors: structural competitors must be expressible. To introduce this alternative,
modular approach to evaluativity, I will focus only on a subset of degree constructions
for which the literature already provides us with an insightful decompositional
account. This is why the remaining of this paper exclusively discusses synthetic,
analytic comparatives and less-comparatives of dimensional adjectives.
2 The EVAL theory of evaluativity
Rett (2008) endorses the common view that gradable antonyms enter the derivation
as non-evaluative and have a relational interpretation as in (4) that holds between
the measurement of an object x and a degree d, such that the measurement of x is
at least as great as d on the relevant scale (cf. Cresswell 1977; von Stechow 1984;
Heim 2000).
(4) JtallK= λx.λd.HEIGHT(x) d (5) JshortK = λx.λd.HEIGHT(x) d
Evaluative interpretations arise when a freely-occurring EVAL morpheme com-
poses with a degree-denoting property. EVAL has a predicate-modifier type that
operates on degree-denoting properties to contribute the reference of a contextually-
provided standard3.
(6) JEVALKc = λD〈d,t〉.λd.D(d)∧d > Standardc
The markedness competition account then exploits the assumption that EVAL is
optional to assign each degree construction two parses, which can be distinguished
in whether or not they involve the EVAL operator. Let us illustrate this point with the
positive-antonym synthetic comparative in (7), repeated from (1).
(7) Athos is taller than Porthos is.
a. Non-evaluative parse: [Athos is tall] [-er [than Porthos is tall]
MAX(λd. tall(athos,d)) > MAX (λd′. tall(porthos,d′))
3 The meaning of EVAL is modeled after the meaning of POS that was originally argued to occur in
positive constructions (Bartsch & Vennemann 1972, Cresswell 1977)
729
Moracchini
b. Evaluative parse: [Athos is tall] [-er [than Porthos is EVAL tall]
MAX(λd. tall(athos,d)) > MAX (λd′. tall(porthos,d′) ∧d′ > Standardtall)
The meaning of the LF in (7a) is that Athos’ height exceeds Porthos’ height. This
corresponds to the non-evaluative construal of (7). Now, on its evaluative construal,
(7) admits the parse in (7b) which adds to the meaning of (7a) the requirement that
the maximal degree to which Porthos is tall exceeds the standard value for tallness4.
Note that although the EVAL account generates two parses for (7), we do not detect
a semantic ambiguity. This is because the evaluative reading of the sentence is a
stronger version of the non-evaluative reading: whenever (7b) is true in a situation,
(7a) will be true as well.
In several other degree constructions however, only the evaluative reading is
available, suggesting that the non-evaluative construal is blocked. The key idea
behind Rett’s (2007, 2008) theory of evaluativity is that this blocking effect is due
to a markedness competition. In the comparative paradigm, Rett considers three
types of markedness triggers: the polarity of adjectives (the negative adjective is
marked whereas the positive adjective is unmarked), the type of comparative operator
(less is marked, whereas the degree operator -er is unmarked) and the shape of the
comparative (analytic comparatives are marked whereas synthetic comparatives are
unmarked). On this account, when a comparative lacks a non-evaluative reading,
is it because its non-evaluative parse is blocked by a less marked competitor that
expresses the same meaning. To illustrate an example of markedness competition,
let us look at the two parses generated for the negative-antonym less-comparative,
provided in (8a) and (8b).
(8) Athos is less short than Porthos is.
a. Non-evaluative parse: [Athos is short] [less [than Porthos is short]]
*MAX(λd. short(athos,d)) < MAX (λd′. short(porthos,d′))
b. Evaluative parse: [Athos is short] [less [than Porthos is EVAL short]]
MAX(λd. short(athos,d)) < MAX (λd′. short(porthos,d′)) ∧d′ > sshort)
First, consider the predicted truth-conditions for the LF that does not include
the EVAL operator, i.e., (8a). This LF says that Athos’ shortness is less great than
Porthos’ shortness. In other words, it says that Athos’ height exceeds Porthos’,
which is exactly the meaning expressed by the comparative Athos is taller than
Porthos, under its non-evaluative parse (see (7a)). Since the two LFs are semantically
4 Based on the observation that the evaluative presupposition does not project out of the matrix clause
of bi-clausal degree constructions in certain environments like the antecedent of conditionals, Rett
(2008) stipulates that EVAL can only occur in standard clauses. I will not adopt this assumption.
Instead, I argue that whenever the presupposition does not project, it is because it is accommodated,
i.e. the evaluative parse also contains an occurrence of the accommodation A-operator.
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equivalent, the markedness competition applies, and forces speakers to use the form
that is less marked. In this case, Rett claims that speakers should prefer the AP taller
over the AP less short, the latter being doubly marked – i.e., the negative antonym
short is marked and the degree operator less is marked too.
However, once EVAL is included, the truth conditions delivered by (8b) and (7b)
are no longer equivalent: in (8b), EVAL modifies the negative antonym and therefore
contributes the reference to a contextual standard for ‘shortness’ whereas in (7b),
EVAL modifies the positive-antonym and therefore, it refers to the contextual standard
for ‘tallness’. Since the presence of the operator yields different interpretations for
the marked and the unmarked constructions, it breaks the markedness competition.
As a consequence, the evaluative reading of the negative-antonym less-comparative
is attested, in accordance with our intuitions about the meaning for (8).
2.1 Issues
Although Rett’s competition account of evaluativity is appealing in its simplicity, it
relies on an intuitive characterization of markedness which makes unwanted predic-
tions in some cases. Consider for instance the treatment of analytic comparatives
like (9) which are reported as being necessarily evaluative. Rett claims that the
analytic variant (more tall) is marked whereas the synthetic variant (taller) is not5.
On this assumption, and the assumption that analytic and synthetic comparatives are
semantically equivalent, the markedness competition applies to the non-evaluative
parse of (9) which turns out to be precluded by the non-evaluative parse of the
synthetic construction in (7a). But what about the evaluative parse of (9)? Above it
was shown how the inclusion of EVAL in a parse can break semantic equivalence
between competitors and therefore save a marked construction from ungrammati-
cality. This reasoning fails to apply to the present case. Indeed, synthetic and the
analytic variants are semantically equivalent under their evaluative parse because
EVAL has the same contribution in the two constructions: it refers to the standard
value for ‘tall’. As a result, the evaluative construal of the analytic comparative in
(9b) is predicted to be blocked by the markedness competition, contrary to facts.
(9) Athos is more tall than Porthos is
a. Non-evaluative parse: [Athos is tall] [more [than Porthos is tall]
*MAX(λd. tall(athos,d)) > MAX (λd′. tall(porthos,d′))
b. Evaluative parse: [Athos is tall] [more [than Porthos is EVAL tall]
MAX(λd. tall(athos,d)) > MAX (λd′. tall(porthos,d′)) ∧d′ > stall)
5 Of course, the competition here is restricted to adjectives that allow for a synthetic and an analytic
form (e.g., smarter - more smart). Independent prosodic constraints are known to block synthetic
forms of ‘long’ adjectives, accounting for unattested forms like *intelligenter (Embick 2007).
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Descriptively, the availability of the reading in (9b) suggests that the general
ability of EVAL to break semantic competition is yet insufficient to explain the whole
distribution of evaluativity in synthetic and analytic comparatives. To summarize,
the markedness competition account correctly explains the missing non-evaluative
readings of analytic comparatives but it only captures half of the puzzle: it does not
explain why analytic comparatives are licensed under their evaluative parse.
More generally, the markedness competition account lacks a markedness theory.
That is, pairs of constructions have to be stipulated as being marked or unmarked
on the basis of what appears to be the case intuitively. For example, the notion of
adjective’s markedness is suggested to arise from two independent sources in Rett
(2008): a morphosyntactic source, that follows from the fact that some negative
antonyms are morphologically marked (cf. possible-impossible), and a more abstract
source that can be interpreted as a conceptual markedness, motivated by the fact
that negative antonyms are derived from their positive counterpart via a form of
negation6. In order to account for further cases, the markedness account is extended
to degree operators. Here again, the notion of markedness is rather unclear; the
complexity that underlies less is claimed to be intuitively semantic whereas the
complexity in more has to be stipulated:
All of the extensions of the EVAL theory [...] require corresponding
extensions of markedness theory. I believe that the markedness as-
sumptions I follow here – e.g. that the synthetic form is less marked
than the analytic – are intuitive, but I have no basis for making
them other than the fact that these assumptions lead to the correct
empirical predictions with respect to evaluativity. (Rett 2008:109)
In sum, one important point that remains unexplained under the EVAL account
concerns the exact nature of markedness. Part of the analysis I will propose directly
addresses this explanatory gap in Rett’s proposal, while providing additional support
for a competition-based approach to the distribution of EVAL.
3 ‘Markedness’ is structural complexity
In this section, I argue that markedness in the sense of Rett can be cashed out in
term of structural complexity, once we adopt a decompositional account of degree
expressions. In particular, I endorse the Syntactic Negation Theory of Antonymy
offered in Heim (2008) and the decomposition of the degree operator more suggested
in Solt (2009) (see also Corver 1997, 2015).
6 ‘Negative-polar antonym seems to semantically encode the force of negation’. (Rett 2008:88)
732
Several decompositional accounts analyze negative antonyms as complex, de-
composable lexical items. In particular, while spelled out as a single word, short
contains two syntactically and semantically distinct ingredients: a negative degree
operator LITTLE and the positive antonym TALL (see among others Rullmann 1995;
Heim 2007; Büring 2007; Bobaljik 2012). Lexical entries that are relevant for the
analysis of antonymy are provided in (10) and the spell-out rule in (11) ensures that
the constituent [LITTLE TALL] licenses the surface form short (The morphophono-
logical operation that creates the portmanteau form associated with the negative
antonym is represented by ‘+’):
(10) Lexical entries
a. JtallK= λx.λd.HEIGHT(x) d
b. JlittleK= λA〈d,t〉.λd. A(d) = 0
(11) Spell-out rule for the negative antonym
[LITTLE+TALL] > ‘short’
The composition of little with a positive degree-denoting property derives the
meaning of the negative antonym short, as illustrated in (12). That is, little tall(x) is
the set of degrees d such that d is not in the set of x’s tallness degrees (i.e., the set of
degrees d such that x is short to d).
(12) JlittleK(JtallK(x))
= λA〈d,t〉.λd. A(d) = 0 (λd.HEIGHT(x) d)
= λd.HEIGHT(x)≺ d
Antonyms are mapped to their comparative form by the degree head -er. The
comparative head projects a DegP situated in [Spec, aP] and selects the than-clause
as complement. The comparative morpheme, commonly treated as a quantifier over
degrees (see also Seuren 1973; von Stechow 1984; Heim 1985, 2000, 2008) of
semantic type 〈dt,〈dt, t〉〉, is defined in (13).
(13) J-erK= λD1.λD2.D2 ⊃ D1
The than-clause in which wh-movement of a null degree operator has taken place
(Chomsky 1977) serves as the first argument of -er, which subsequently combines
with the matrix clause it abstracts over. On this semantics, the comparative is true if
and only if the set of degrees denoted by the matrix-clause properly contains the set
of degrees denoted by the than-clause.
A regular -er-comparative like (14) is thus represented along the lines of (14a).
The subjects Athos and Porthos are base-generated as sisters of the matrix and
standard predicates and raise to their surface position, leaving copies which are
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unpronounced at PF but which get interpreted at LF. It is also assumed that the
standard clause is merged late in the derivation as the internal argument of the
comparative operator (c.f. Bhatt & Pancheva 2004), and it is subject to Comparative
Deletion, an ellipsis mechanism that (minimally) elides the standard predicate. These
assumptions produce the denotation for (14) in (14b) and its associated PF in (14c).
(14) Porthos is taller than Aramis is.
a. [[IP Porthosi is -er1 Porthosi tall] [-er1 [CP than [CP wh2 Aramis j is wh2
Aramis j tall]]]]
b. LF: [λ1. t1 Porthos tall] [-er [λ2. t2 Aramis tall]]
Semantic computation:Jλ2. t2 Aramis tallK = {d : d.HEIGHT(aramis) d}Jλ1. t1 Porthos tallK = {d : d.HEIGHT(porthos) d}J-erK (Jλ2. t2 Aramis tallK) (Jλ1. t1 Porthos tallK) =
{d : d.HEIGHT(porthos) d} ⊃ {d : d.HEIGHT(aramis) d}
i.e., the set of degrees to which Porthos is tall is a proper superset of the
set of degrees to which Aramis is tall.
c. PF: [[IP Porthosi is 1 Porthosi tall-er] [-er1 [CP than [CP wh2 Aramis j is
wh2 Aramis j tall]]]]
On this non-lexicalist view of antonymy, the negative-antonym comparative ad-
mits the representation in (15). In this derivation, the comparative morpheme relates
two negative degree-denoting properties, each of which results from modifying the
positive predicate by an instance of the LITTLE operator.
(15) Porthos is shorter than Aramis is.
a. [[IP Porthosi is -er1 little Porthosi tall] [-er1 [CP than [CP wh2 Aramis j is
wh2 little Aramis j tall]]]]
b. LF: [λ1. t1 little Porthos tall] [-er [λ2. t2 little Aramis tall]]
Semantic computation:Jλ2. t2 little Aramis tallK = {d : d.HEIGHT(aramis)≺ d}Jλ1. t1 little Porthos tallK = {d : d.HEIGHT(porthos)≺ d}J-erK (Jλ2. t2 little Aramis tallK) (Jλ1. t1 little Porthos tallK) =
{d : d.HEIGHT(porthos)≺ d} ⊃ {d : d.HEIGHT(aramis)≺ d}
i.e., iff the set of degrees to which Porthos is short is a proper superset of
the set of degrees to which Aramis is short.
c. PF1: [[IP Porthosi is Porthosi [little+tall]-er] [-er1 [CP than [CP wh2 Aramis j
is wh2 Aramis j little+tall]]]]
Let us now turn to a derivation that contains the degree word less. Proponents
of the Syntactic Negation Theory of Antonymy have proposed that less is not a
semantic primitive based on the consideration of (16a-16b):
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(16) Situation: Aramis’ height exceeds Porthos’ height.
a. Porthos is shorter than Aramis is.
b. Porthos is less tall than Aramis is.
Although (16a) morphologically belongs to the class of -er-comparatives, it
expresses inferiority just like (16b) does; indeed, the two sentences are synonymous.
To account for this synonymy, it has been proposed that the aPs less tall and shorter
involve the same building blocks, namely [aP -ER LITTLE TALL]. Note that on the
decompositional account of negative antonyms, LITTLE always composes with the
positive antonym (due to its semantic type 〈dt,dt〉), so how is it possible to derive the
less word? Because LITTLE – independently of its semantic contribution – exhibits a
flexible morphological distribution: it is pronounced short or less depending on the
constituent it gets spelled out with (cf. Bobaljik 2012). The relevant spell-out rules
are provided in (17) and (18).
(17) [-ER+LITTLE] > less (18) [LITTLE+TALL] > short
On this assumption, the synonymy of (16a) and (16b) is simply due to the fact
that the two comparatives share the same structure in (15a), and therefore the same
LF (see (15b)) but result from alternative PF realizations. In particular, the positive-
antonym less-comparative arises by application of the spell-out rule in (17) instead
of (18):
(19) PF2: [[IP Porthosi is [-er+little] Porthosi tall] [-er1 [CP than [CP wh2 Aramis j
is wh2 little Aramis j tall]]]]
Porthos is less tall than Aramis is.
At last, the decompositional account also generates negative-antonym less-
comparatives: the underlying representation of less short in (20) involves a sequence
of two negative little operators which spell out independently by application of the
two spell-out rules in (17) and (18). Namely, the positive antonym PF-merges with
the most embedded occurrence of LITTLE allowing for the vocabulary insertion of
short whereas the higher occurrence of LITTLE PF-merges with -ER allowing for
the vocabulary insertion of less. However, as discussed in the introduction, this
non-evaluative parse is somehow blocked by competition.
(20) Porthos is less short than Aramis is.
*[[IP Porthosi is -er1 little little Porthosi tall] [-er1 [CP than [CP wh2 Aramis j
is wh2 little little Aramis j tall]]]]
In addition to the decompositional account of antonymy, I further assume that the
analytic form more involves more syntactic structure than just the -er degree head: it
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spells out a semantically vacuous much operator in addition to -er (c.f. Solt 2009,
Corver 1997). Just like little, much is a degree modifier for gradable properties, but
it is essentially contentless, i.e., it denotes an identity function on degree predicates.
(21) JmuchK= λA〈d,t〉.λd. A(d) = 1
As for other portmanteaus studied so far, a specific spell-out rule for the analytic
form is provided in (22). It completes our list of spell-out rules for the comparative
paradigm. Following these assumptions, our system generates analytic comparatives
as exemplified in (23).
(22) [-ER+MUCH] > more
(23) Porthos is more tall than Aramis is.
a. [IP Porthosi is -er1 much Porthosi tall] [-er1 [CP than [CP wh2 Aramis j is
wh2 much Aramis j tall]]]
b. LF: [λ1. t1 (much) Porthos tall] [-er [λ2. t2 (much) Aramis tall]]
Semantic computation:Jλ2. t2 (much) Aramis tallK = {d : d.HEIGHT(aramis) d}Jλ1. t1 (much) Porthos tallK = {d : d.HEIGHT(porthos) d}J-erK (Jλ2. t2 (much) Aramis tallK) (Jλ1. t1 (much) Porthos tallK) =
{d : d.HEIGHT(porthos) d} ⊃ {d : d.HEIGHT(aramis) d}
i.e., iff the set of degrees to which Porthos is tall is a proper superset of the
set of degrees to which Aramis is tall.
c. PF1: [IP Porthosi is Porthosi [-er+much] tall] [-er1 [CP than [CP wh2
Aramis j is wh2 much Aramis j tall]]]
In the semantics just presented, there are no entries for less, short and more.
Instead, their meaning is derived via two covert operators, little and much, which add
up extra layers of syntactic structure whenever they are included in the derivation.
As a consequence, this type of account predicts a structural difference between
negative and positive antonyms, namely short is structurally more complex than tall.
Similarly, the difference between degree operators can be stated in terms of structural
complexity: all other things being equal, a degree expression that contains less or
more is more complex than a degree expression that only involves the comparative
head -er. It should now clearly appear that the constructions considered as ‘marked’
on Rett’s approach involve structurally complex aPs (namely, less short, more tall
and more short). Given these findings, I propose that Rett’s notion of markedness
translates into structural complexity.
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4 The proposal: structural competition
In the previous section, I have proposed a new metrics for comparing degree con-
structions based on the structural complexity of the aPs they involve. In this section,
I develop a formal account of semantic competition. First, the grammaticality of
degree constructions is determined by comparing them with structural alternatives.
The generation of such alternatives follows from Katzir’s 2007 definition in (24).
(24) Structural Alternatives Altstr (Katzir 2007)
If a structure α can be derived from β by substituting terminal nodes in β
with lexical items or with subconstituents of β , or by deleting subconstituents
of β , then α ∈Altstr(β ).
Capitalizing on the decompositional account introduced in Section 3, the relevant
structural alternatives in the comparative paradigm are naturally derived by deletion
or substitution of little and much operators (or both). As a result, non-evaluative aPs
can be hierarchically ordered as a function of how much structure they involve, as
illustrated in Figure 1 (subjects of aPs are omitted for clarity). In this diagram, a
grey arrow pointing from a given box containing an aP α to another box containing
an aP β is to be read as α ∈ Altstr(β ), i.e. α is a structural alternative to β .
[er tall]
taller
[er little tall]
shorter, less tall
[er much tall]
more tall
[er little little tall]
less short
[er much little tall]
more short
less complexity
more complexity
Figure 1 Structural hierarchy of non-evaluative aPs.
Second, I propose the LF-Economy principle in (25), by which structurally com-
plex aPs are precluded by simpler structural alternatives whenever these alternatives
express the same meaning.
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(25) Minimize aPs!
For any LF φ , any aP α in φ , α is deviant in φ if α can be replaced in φ with
a structural alternative, β , such that
a. β is semantically equivalent to α , and
b. β is structurally simpler than α
Minimize aPs! belongs to the family of structural economy constraints that
impose limits on syntactic complexity. It ensures that syntactic representations that
exhibit structural redundancies are licensed only when they yield an interpretation
that would not be available otherwise (a.o. Chomsky 1993; Corver 1997; Reinhart
1998; Meyer 2015; Marty 2016, 2017).
With these tools in place, we are now ready to see how the LF-principle Minimize
aPs! evaluates the different structural alternatives provided in Figure 1. But before
going into the details, note that, by definition, this economy principle only applies
to semantically equivalent aPs. On this criterion for instance, the aP shorter has a
structurally simpler alternative, namely taller, yet it is not ruled out by since this
alternative has a different meaning.
4.1 Polarity-driven competition
Consider now the pair of non-evaluative sentences in (26) which were predicted to
compete on Rett’s account. Their LFs are given in (27a) and (27b), respectively. To
begin with, one can verify with the parses in (26a) and (26b) that the aP in ψ is a
structural alternative to the aP in φ : [aP -er tall] is derivable from [aP -er little little
tall] by deletion of the two negative operators in the matrix and the standard clause.
Consequently, ψ ∈ Altstr(φ ). Furthermore, by double negation cancellation in (27a),
we observe that the aPs in (27a) and (27b) are semantically equivalent. Therefore,
by Minimize aPs!, (27a) is deviant due to the availability of (27b).
(26) a. Athos is less short than Porthos is.
φ : [[IP Athosi is -er1 little little Athosi tall] [-er1
[CP than [CP wh2 Porthos j is wh2 little little Porthos j tall]]]]
b. Athos is taller than Porthos is.
ψ: [[IP Athosi is -er1 Athosi tall] [-er1
[CP than [CP wh2 Porthos j is wh2 Porthos j tall]]]]
(27) a. LF: *[λ1. t1 little little Athos tall] [-er [λ2. t2 little little Porthos tall]]
{d: ¬¬ [HEIGHT(athos) < d]} ⊃ {d: ¬¬ [HEIGHT(porthos) < d]}
b. LF: [λ1. t1 Athos t tall] [-er [λ2. t2 Porthos tall]]
{d: HEIGHT(athos) < d} ⊃ {d: HEIGHT(porthos) < d}
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4.2 Analytic and synthetic comparatives
Turning to analytic and synthetic comparatives, it follows from our assumptions
about the syntax of more that analytic comparatives always admit structurally simpler
synthetic alternatives (see Figure 1). These alternatives are derivable by deletion of
much. Moreover, since much is semantically vacuous, the equivalence between aPs
in (28a) and (28b) obtains straightforwardly. As a result, the non-evaluative parse of
the analytic comparative is deemed deviant by Minimize aPs!.
(28) Analytic and synthetic comparatives: competition #1
a. Athos is more short than Porthos is.
φ : *[Ai is -er1 much little Ai tall] [-er1 [wh2 P j is wh2 much little P j tall]]
b. Athos is shorter than Porthos is.
ψ: [Ai is -er1 little Ai tall] [-er1 [ wh2 P j is wh2 little P j tall]]
As shown in (29), this line of explanation extends to the case of non-evaluative
positive antonym comparatives as well.
(29) Analytic and synthetic comparatives: competition #2
a. Athos is more tall than Porthos is.
φ : *[Ai is -er1 much Ai tall] [-er1 [ than wh2 P j is wh2 much P j tall]]
b. Athos is taller than Porthos is.
ψ: [Ai is -er1 Ai tall] [-er1 [ than wh2 P j is wh2 P j tall]]
A summary of the different competitions is provided in Figure (2), where the
double arrows represent semantic equivalence between aPs.
[er tall]
taller
[er LITTLE tall]
shorter, less tall
*[er MUCH tall]
more tall
*[er LITTLE LITTLE tall]
less short
*[er MUCH LITTLE tall]
more short
less complexity
more complexity
Figure 2 Structural and semantic competition of non-evaluative aPs
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We have captured the distribution of non-evaluative readings in comparatives.
Now, what about evaluative readings? In the present approach, analytic comparatives
are semantically equivalent to their synthetic counterparts due to the semantic vacuity
of much, and that even in presence of the EVAL operator. Hence, unless supplemented
by additional assumptions, the present analysis makes the same inadequate empirical
predictions as Rett does for analytic comparatives (see 2.1). In the following section,
I will argue that the problem is not the competition itself but the nature of alternatives.
I will propose that synthetic comparatives are never evaluative due to a PF-constraint
that prevents EVAL to occur between the -er affix and the adjectival head that selects
for it.
5 PF-constraint on the distribution of EVAL
In addition to provide a metrics for semantic competition, the decomposition of
degree expressions also offers an interesting perspective on the formation of mor-
phologically complex expressions. In particular, in the comparative paradigm, there
are two types of operations that form complex words: affixation of the comparative
head in synthetic comparatives, and portmanteau formation in the case of negative
antonyms, more and less. In this section, I articulate a proposal that (a) integrates
evaluativity in the decompositional framework and (b) takes into account the scope of
the evaluativity operator with respect to elements that participate in the formation of
complex words. The claim I will put forward is that EVAL can disrupt PF-adjacency
which is a pre-requisite for spell-out rules application. In other words, EVAL acts as
an intervener.
5.1 Evaluativity in a decompositional account
Our first task is to implement Rett’s EVAL operator within a decompositional frame-
work. Recall that, on Rett’s analysis, the standard associated with polar adjectives
in evaluative contexts is hypothesized to directly follow from the semantics of each
antonym. On the decompositional account, such an approach would assign negative
antonyms the standard of the positive antonym they are based on. In other words, if
short spells out [LITTLE TALL], then applying EVAL to this constituent should derive
a standard of tallness instead of a standard of shortness. To solve this issue, I adopt a
view on which the standard of comparison is a contextually provided vague interval
of degrees called the Standard Set (Stdc). By assumption, this set contains degrees
that are neither in the extension of the positive antonym, nor in the extension of the
negative antonym. Consequently, the scale for relative adjectives like tall and short
is divided into three zones: above the maximal boundary of Stdc are the degrees that
qualify as ‘tall’, below the minimal boundary of Stdc are the degrees that qualify
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as ‘short’ and the standard set itself contains neutral degrees, i.e., degrees that are
neither ‘tall’ nor ‘short’. Following this proposal, the lexical entry for EVAL is to be
rewritten as in (30) so as to derive a suitable standard for both the positive and the
negative antonym.7
(30) JevalKc = λD〈d,t〉 : D⊃ Stdc. D
EVAL denotes an identity function on degree predicates, and introduces the eval-
uativity presupposition that the degree predicate D properly contains a contextually
provided standard set:
(31) Jeval tallKc (x) = λd : tall(x)⊃ STDc. HEIGHT(x) < d
∞ (HEIGHT)0
λd.tall(x,d)︷ ︸︸ ︷
)
Stdc
The requirement imposed by the EVAL operator is that the set of x’s tallness degrees
properly contains the standard set. Due to the properties of scales, this condition
is fulfilled only when the degree property denoted by eval tall(x) is true of some
degrees that are above the maximal boundary of the standard set, and by definition,
those are degrees that qualify as ‘tall degrees’. By the same reasoning, in (32), eval
little tall(x) is true of some degrees that are below the minimal boundary of the
standard set, and by definition, those are degrees that qualify as ‘short degrees’.
(32) Jeval little tallKc (x)=λd : little tall(x)⊃ Stdc. HEIGHT(x)≺ d
∞ (HEIGHT)0
λd.¬tall(x,d)︷ ︸︸ ︷
)
Stdc
The relative scope of EVAL has direct consequences on the type of presupposition
it gives rise to. Consider for instance the schematic string in (33). At PF, this string
could in principle be realized in two different ways given the spellout rules given
in (17) and (18), i.e., as less tall or as shorter. At LF, however, the evaluative
operator modifies the positive antonym tall, and thus gives rise to a presupposition
that refers to a standard of tallness. This presupposition is compatible with the
meaning expressed by less tall in an evaluative context, but not with that expressed
by shorter. Based on this observation, it seems then that the presence of EVAL in
(33) blocks the surface form shorter.
(33) [-er little eval tall]
PF: less tall, *shorter
7 This revised version of the EVAL operator is modeled after a definition for POS as in von Stechow
(2009), Heim (2007), Solt (2015) among others.
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From there, I see two possible options to explain the restrictions that seem to apply
in (33). If this fragment does not correspond to the surface form shorter it may
be because (i) shorter is in fact never evaluative – that is it cannot be associated
with a string that contains EVAL – or (ii) the sequence in (33) admits only one
possible morphological realization, which has to be less tall. A way of implementing
this second option consists in deriving the apparent blocking effect in the PF-
component of the grammar: whenever the operator EVAL intervenes between the
negative operator and the positive antonym, the PF-realization of the string cannot
be pronounced as short. I am now going to argue that both explanations are right.
5.2 Myers’ Generalization and the Expressibility Condition
I propose to reanalyze the morphophonological intervention effect of EVAL as a
consequence of Myers’ generalization (Myers 1984). That is, I submit that EVAL is
a zero morpheme subject the following constraint:
(34) Myers’ generalization
A ∅-derived form cannot undergo further affixation/PF-processes.
Myers’ generalization works as a PF-filter on derivations. For example, once the
null morpheme EVAL is affixed to a gradable predicate, it predicts that any bound
morpheme on the top of it (MUCH, LITTLE, -ER) must be realized independently.
This way, Myers’ generalization has two direct consequences on the treatment of
evaluative aPs. First, EVAL can block the application of spell-out rules for the
portmanteau forms short, less and more as shown in (35). Second, since EVAL
blocks further affixation of the form it attaches to, it follows that synthetic forms
cannot be evaluative. This is illustrated in (36).
(35) EVAL is an intervener for portmanteau formation
a. short: [little+tall], *[little ∅EVAL-tall]×
b. less: [-er+little], *[-er ∅EVAL-little]×
c. more: [-er+much], *[-er ∅EVAL-little]×
(36) EVAL blocks affixation of -er
a. taller: [-er tall], *[-er ∅EVAL-tall]×
b. shorter: [-er little tall], *[-er ∅EVAL-[little×
tall]]
742
Myers’ generalization indirectly constrains the distribution of the EVAL operator
and it does so in a way that appears relevant for semantic competition. For example,
on the present account, the synthetic forms in (36) are simpler structural alternatives
of the analytic forms in (28a) and (29a). In this case, the LF-principle Minimize aPs!
wrongly predicts that analytics forms are precluded by their synthetic alternatives.
However, by Myers’ generalization, those forms don’t have PF-outputs, thus raising
an interesting question: can they count as well-formed alternatives for semantic
competition? I will stipulate that they can’t. For Myers’ generalization to have an
impact on competition, Minimize aPs! must be revised accordingly as follows:
(37) Minimize aPs! (Final version)
For any LF φ , any aP α in φ , α is deviant in φ if α can be replaced in φ with
an expressible structural alternative, β , such that
a. β is semantically equivalent to α , and
b. β is structurally simpler than α
This modification of Minimize aPs! adds a morphophonological wellformedness
condition on structural alternatives. On this revised version of Minimize aPs!,
evaluative synthetic aPs do no longer qualify as potential competitors. In turn,
evaluative analytic forms (i.e., more tall, more short, less tall and less short) satisfy
both interfaces: EVAL occurs at word boundaries without intervening in PF processes,
and in absence of relevant structural alternatives, their evaluative parses is licensed
by Minimize aPs!. Figure 3 provides a visual summary of attested evaluative aPs.
*[-er ∅EVAL-tall]×
taller
*[-er ∅EVAL-[LITTLE×
tall] ]
shorter
X[[-er LITTLE] ∅EVAL-tall]
less tall
X[[-er MUCH] ∅EVAL- tall]
more tall
X[[-er LITTLE] ∅EVAL- [LITTLE tall]]
less short
X[[-er MUCH] ∅EVAL- [LITTLE tall]]
more short
Figure 3 Attested evaluative aPs in comparative constructions
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6 Conclusion
In the present paper, I have developed a formal account of the distribution of evalua-
tivity which builds on important ideas and findings from existing theories. Endorsing
the logic behind Rett’s EVAL competition-account, I have proposed a principled way
for generating the candidates for competition. Specifically, I have shown that the
notion of markedness can be recast in terms of structural complexity, once we adopt
non-lexicalist accounts for degree expressions.
The present account further departs from Rett’s EVAL account by making it
crucial that the distribution of evaluativity does not solely depend on semantic
competition. Instead, it is regulated at the two interfaces: the LF-principle Minimize
aPs! is designed to account for the deviancy of certain structurally complex degree
expressions while the PF-filter Myers’ generalization imposes a wellformedness
condition on morphologically complex expressions. The resulting picture offers a
solution to the evaluativity puzzle at the crossroads of the different modules of the
grammar.
As mentioned in the introduction, the distribution of evaluativity goes beyond
comparative constructions. Future research will have to show whether this analysis
can be extended to cover degree constructions such as positives, superlatives and
equatives. I think chances are good that these cases can be accounted for by a
modular account of evaluativity too.
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